For debate:Health service support planning for large-scale defensive land operations (part 2) by Bricknell, Martin et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.1136/jramc-2018-000994
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Bricknell, M., Finn, A., & Palmer, J. (2019). For debate: Health service support planning for large-scale defensive
land operations (part 2). Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps, 165(3), 176-179.
https://doi.org/10.1136/jramc-2018-000994
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 10. Jul. 2020
1 
 
FOR DEBATE: HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT PLANNING FOR LARGE SCALE 
DEFENSIVE LAND OPERATIONS (PART 2) – PRE-PRINT 
 
Published as: For debate: health service support planning for large-scale defensive 
land operations (part 2). Martin Bricknell, A Finn, J Palmer. Journal of the Royal 
Army Medical Corps Jun 2019, 165 (3) 176-179; DOI: 10.1136/jramc-2018-000994 
PMID: 30127067 
 
Authors: 
 
Corresponding author: 
 
Lieutenant General MCM Bricknell QHP 
Surgeon General 
Defence Medical Services (Whittington) 
Tamworth Road 
Lichfield 
Staffordshire 
WS14 9PY 
 
Colonel A Finn 
 
Colonel JV Palmer 
 
Abstract 
 
This is the second of two articles that considers the medical planning implications of 
large scale defensive military operations. This paper describes a unified approach to 
Theatre Level Health Services Support planning based on four phases: collection, 
hospitalisation, evacuation and reception. It highlights the need for a modular and 
agile system of medical capability building blocks that can be grouped together for 
specific military medical challenges. It also reintroduces the concepts of mass 
casualty (MASCAL) and the medical reserve. These two papers are designed to 
encourage debate around how we should be organised to face the new challenges 
of HSS in potential peer on peer military operations. 
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This second paper builds upon the interpretations of the new military context and 
medical planning factors introduced in the first paper. The previous paper highlighted 
the need for a networked, agile, and layered integrated health services support 
(HSS) system that could adapt to an increasingly lethal close battle environment, the 
potential use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons and 
the likelihood for local mass casualty events. This paper considers how to integrate 
these ideas into a Theatre Level HSS Concept. 
 
Theatre Level HSS Concept 
 
The principles of the operational patient care pathway (OPCP) and the concept of 
the HSS to the joint operational area remain valid. However, these concepts need to 
be refined to ensure that the medical plan can cope with multiple concurrent casualty 
incidents within a single theatre and can organise capability and capacity to cope 
with much higher casualty numbers, and that medical capabilities can survive in the 
new military environment. In the Cold War a similar need led to the concept of 
functional approach ‘zones’ of medical support (1,2). These were; the Collecting 
Zone, the Hospitalisation Zone, the Evacuation Zone and the Reception Zone.  This 
concept remains valid, however, reflecting the 360 degree character of contemporary 
conflict, it may be better to conceive of these as dynamic, conceptual ’phases’ rather 
than fixed, geographical ’zones’. 
 
This is illustrated at Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 
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Collecting Phase. The Collecting Phase encompasses the activity of the entire pre-
hospital care (PHC) component of the OPCP. At scale, Medical Regiments and 
associated organic unit medical assets will operate as a Brigade Medical Groups, to 
collect casualties and ‘clear’ the battlefield.  A network of casualty clearing points 
(provided by Isolated Combat Medical Technicians (CMT) or Pre-Hospital Treatment 
Teams (PHTT) will receive, triage, stabilise and handover casualties for evacuation.  
Casualty clearing stations (provided by PHTTs or Medical Reception Stations (MRS) 
Battlegroup or Brigade controlled Medical Rendez-vous Points (Med RVs) will need 
to act as holding points in which patients can be triaged and ‘pulsed’ by medical 
evacuation to a hospital.  When required, it will be necessary to augment a GP-led 
MRS with a Ground Medical Emergency Response Team to generate ‘a dressing 
station’ (DS) like capability providing the highest level of PHEC.  Extending this 
principle of modularity further, a SHQ, MRS, Ground MERT (from a Med Regt) and 
Forward Surgical Team (deployed forward from a Field Hospital) must be capable of 
coming together seamlessly to establish a task-specific Forward Resuscitation and 
Surgical Group (FRSG). Where Forward AE is available this will need to be carefully 
regulated to meet rapidly changing tactical and clinical need. 
  
Throughout the operation medical planners will need to rapidly adapt the healthcare 
system by manipulating capability building blocks to enable tactical actions.  To 
achieve this, medical planners will need to be fully integrated at every level of 
command and fully empowered to make the requisite decisions.  To generate and 
4 
 
maintain tempo transition phases will need to be minimised and there will be 
insufficient time to redesign medical capability in contact; therefore all medical 
capability building blocks will need to be inherently agile by design. 
 
When not functioning in the DS role in response to large numbers of casualties, the 
MRS provides primary and community care clinical services using general practice, 
dental, rehabilitation, mental health and environmental health professionals. This is 
particularly relevant during Battlegroup rehabilitation and will continue to replicate the 
standards of care provided by a similar clinical service in the Firm Base but adapted 
to the realities of the operational environment. 
 
Where the enemy has broken through, units will withdraw to new defensive 
locations. Local counter-attacks will attempt to disrupt the enemy advance. It is likely 
the whole area will be under indirect attack and so command and control may be 
disrupted. All units, including medical, may have to act independently under mission 
command. 
 
An operational or strategic counter-attack will require a HSS plan that supports 
manoeuvre. This will require open medical facilities ready to receive casualties from 
the first contact battle. Medical units will also need to be packed on wheels so that 
they can keep up with the advance, opening when large numbers of casualties 
require treatment.   
 
Hospitalisation phase. During the Hospitalisation phase patients receive stabilising 
clinical care. This includes diagnostic support, clinical interventions and intensive 
medical and nursing care. Whilst the most emergent casualties might receive some 
‘hospital services’ in the FST, the deployed hospital care system must have sufficient 
capacity for all patients requiring hospitalisation. It is highly likely that hospitals will 
be echeloned with forward and rear hospital groupings.   
 
’Forward’ Field Hospitals will be focused on providing acute care and need to be 
manoeuvrable (capable of supporting Formation manoeuvre) and modular (capable 
of operating in a dispersed configuration for protection and/or to support dispersion).  
While all medical facilities will have to be able to function under the threat of a CBRN 
attack, a hospital may be nominated to be the specialist receiving hospital for CBRN 
casualties in order focus effort and to minimise any risk of contamination of the 
evacuation system by CBRN agents. ’Rear’ based Force Support Hospitals will be 
located in a safe area, will be static, and provide a wider range of clinical services.  
Force Support Hospitals will be capable of definitive treatment, thereby maximising 
retention of fighting power in Theatre, or holding casualties prior to Evacuation. 
 
Where deployed hospital care is echeloned in this manner, the Hospitalisation Phase 
will include a period of intra-theatre tactical evacuation.  To maximise patient safety, 
it is likely that many patients will be evacuated by air supported by specialist critical 
care air support teams (CCAST).  During period of very high demand this may 
require supplementation by high volume clinical transport services such as coaches 
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or ambulance convoys in order to change MEDEVAC from an emergency response 
to a pulsed, planned movement.  
 
The evacuation system must be able to regulate non-UK patients to the appropriate 
receiving hospital including transfer to the local civilian system. It may also be 
possible to include the local civilian health system as part of the HSS plan for UK 
patients. This may include the use of civilian ambulances, coaches and trains to 
support patient evacuation.    
 
Evacuation phase. The Evacuation Zone covers the functions of preparing patients 
for Strategic Evacuation (STRATEVAC) and loading them into STRATEVAC 
platforms. This requires a clinical holding unit and a medical loading unit alongside 
the ‘port’ function that can receive the mass transport platform with its associated 
medical escorts. In the recent past, these functions have been highly specialised 
within the RAF medical services including the creation of the Hospital Staging Unit 
that combined the holding, preparation and loading function into a single medical 
unit. However, it may be necessary to use alternative modes of mass casualty 
transport including civilian aeroplanes and boats if large number of casualties require 
STRATEVAC.   
 
Reception phase.  The reception phase will normally take place within the UK. It is 
likely that the national ‘Gold Command’ level of NHS bed management within the 
NHS Emergency Planning, Resilience and Response Plan will need to be activated 
for large numbers of military casualties being received from overseas. The NHS will 
need to advise the military aeromedical evacuation system of the location of 
available NHS beds, especially the Intensive Care and Burns Care beds as these will 
require national control. Military patients may need to be distributed across the whole 
of the NHS and so there may need to be military welfare and other support services 
available dispersed across many NHS sites. The Armed Forces will need to provide 
the ‘Role 4’ effect to these military patients by ensuring that military personnel are 
available to provide clinical advice, welfare and social support to the patients and 
their social group wherever they end up in the NHS system. 
 
Historically, reception has been a national responsibility.  Given that it is likely that 
different nations see a peak of casualties at different times, a fully integrated 
healthcare system could see multi-national burden sharing becoming a matter of 
routine.  This will add another level of complexity to reception arrangement within the 
UK. 
 
Execution 
  
Executing this Theatre Level HSS Concept requires our approach to managing HSS 
to be reframed for the scale and complexity of casualty movement and the medical 
system. Over the past 10 years there has been considerable success in introducing 
inherent agility, air-land integration, and layering of clinical capability in medical 
operational capability, but there is still a lot more that can be done.  However, agility 
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in capability is only of value if there is the corresponding agility of mind to exploit it. 
Achieving the latter is in part education and training, but it will also require a shift in 
culture to fully empower junior commanders, to become comfortable with ambiguity 
and, most importantly, to understand and manage clinical risk.   It is likely that the 
specific requirements of Command and Control, Co-ordination, Computers and 
Information (C4I) will need specific consideration. This will require medical staff 
branches within command headquarters to have sufficient capacity to operate across 
the 24 hour cycle and to be able to communicate to medical units and evacuation 
platforms across organisational boundaries. The volume of medical information 
needed to be processed and managed to inform medical evacuation decisions is 
likely to be beyond most people’s previous experience. This will have to function 
under the threat of cyber warfare and blocking of access to the electromagnetic 
spectrum by the opposition. There is likely to be additional co-ordination and liaison 
staff in medical units and command organisations to track coalition patients across 
different nation’s medical units. It will be essential to establish and refine all aspects 
of medical interoperability during any pre-conflict period so as to achieve the highest 
possible level of integration across the Coalition medical system, including with the 
host nation.  
 
The allocation of real estate for medical units is likely to prove challenging as they 
require specific features (access, security, water, power, environmental protection) 
that is likely to be very scarce. There will be a specific decision about the use of the 
Red Cross as a protective emblem as this might indicate the distribution of combat 
forces or be used from targeting if the opposition does not respect the Geneva 
Conventions.    
 
There will significant pressure on clinical leadership and clinical decision-making. 
Triage choices will become much more challenging, especially in MASCAL 
situations. Clinicians will have to accept ‘rationing’ of time and clinical resources 
such as imaging and blood so as to ensure equity of access for the largest 
proportion of the patient flow. Clinical standardisation becomes even more important 
as the amount of clinical time to care for each patient is reduced. Medical facilities 
will have to accept the probability of ‘prolonged care’ in both pre-hospital care and 
deployed hospital care. 
  
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons are considerably 
more likely to be used than previously experienced on recent military operations. 
This will require the medical services to be competent to treat casualties from these 
agents and also to operate medical evacuation and medical facilities under the threat 
of these weapons. It will be necessary to refresh our concepts for how both functions 
are undertaken. 
 
Re-learning experiences from the past 
 
Overall, there are very few aspects of this new challenge that will require completely 
new solutions. Whilst there have been considerable advances in clinical 
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interventions for trauma casualties, the fundamental challenge in military medicine of 
matching evacuation and clinical treatment to the needs of military patients remains 
unchanged. Therefore we can derive considerable value in historical study and 
research to re-learn the strategic and operational solutions applied by our 
predecessors to similar challenges in World War 1, World War 2 and during the Cold 
War. The Staff Ride remains an excellent educational vehicle for this type of learning 
(3). In doing so we must critically appraise the lessons from the past rather than 
accepting at face value; as this article demonstrates the future is likely to involve a 
blend of lessons from the past and contemporary innovation. As an example, we 
have demonstrated the clinical effectiveness of the Medical Emergency Response 
Team (MERT) as a helicopter-based medical evacuation capability compared to 
other helicopter-based clinical groups (4). However in a peer-on-peer conflict, our 
approach to the use of Air MERT might shift to collecting the most severely injured 
from dismounted Ground based MERT grouped with a MRS (a “Dressing Station”) or 
a FRSG 
 
Conclusions 
 
These two papers have examined the HSS challenges associated with large scale 
defensive operations. It is important that the medical services align to emerging 
thoughts about the organisation of combat and combat services support capabilities 
as a result of the change in the threats to UK national security. Whilst the 
fundamental principles of HSS remain unchanged, their application will need to 
adapt from the experience gained from HSS delivery in lower scale counter-
insurgency operations. This requires a new Theatre Level Concept for HSS that 
builds upon the OPCP and applies to circumstances where there will multiple, 
concurrent medical major incidents. This requires a much larger medical system 
organised according to functional phases comprising Collecting, Hospitalisation, 
Evacuation and Reception with medical units and evacuation platforms organised to 
deliver these functions. This will also require a C4I system capable of managing 
much more information, delivering dynamic air-land integration and interoperability 
with coalition partners, including host nation. We will need to consider how our 
predecessors organised themselves to solve the military medical problem at this 
scale in previous conflicts in order to interpret their lessons into the modern day.  We 
must though not disregard the lessons learnt during recent deliberate ops, 
specifically in Iraq and Afghanistan; most importantly, this will require both the agility 
of force design and the corresponding agility of mind if we are to capable of 
succeeding in the challenges that large scale war-fighting will inevitably bring. 
Readers of this Journal are encouraged to think about these concepts and develop 
them further through debate. 
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